AmericanConscience.Org
A voice in the wilderness
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The quest for certainty
blocks the quest for meaning.
Erich Fromm
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The Sept 2004 study from the Defense Science Board is good news. Muslims don't hate our
freedom or our democracy. They hate our hypocritical policy of supporting corrupt leadership
in their own lands while claiming that we support freedom.
We need to examine our policies from the perspective of a larger frame. We need to see with
better eyes.
Newsweek / Fareed Zakaria
Christian Science Monitor / Tom Regan
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The Christian Science Monitor
2004.11.29
"They Hate Our Policies, Not Our Freedom"
By Tom Regan
Quietly released Pentagon report contains major criticisms of administration.
______
Late on the Wednesday afternoon before the Thanksgiving holiday, the US Defense
Department released a report by the Defense Science Board that is highly critical of the
administration's efforts in the war on terror and in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (PDF
file; here).
The Pentagon released the study after The New York Times ran a story about the report in
its Wednesday editions.
The Defense Science Board, reports Disinfopedia, is "a Federal advisory committee
established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense."
China's Xinhuanet reported that the board's report criticized the US for failing in its efforts
to communicate its military and diplomatic actions to the world, and the Muslim world in
particular, "but no public relations campaign can save America from flawed policies." The
report also takes the administration to task for talking about Islamic extremism in a way that
offends many Muslims.
MSNBC notes that the report, in a comment that directly goes against statements made by
President Bush and senior cabinet members, says the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have
united otherwise-divided Muslim extremists and given terrorists organizations like Al Qaeda
a boost by "raising their stature."
In fact, Wired News reported the board as saying, the US has not only failed to separate
"the vast majority of nonviolent Muslims from the radical-militant Islamist-Jihadists," but
American efforts may have "achieved the opposite of what they intended."
Al Jazeera reported Thursday that the board called for the creation of a strategic
communication's "apparatus" within the executive branch and "an overhaul of public
diplomacy, public affairs and information dissemination efforts by the Pentagon and State
Department."
As columnist Thomas Freidman of The New York Times wrote Monday in an opinion piece,
the lack of planning and a 'clear channel of communication to the Muslim world' means that
the US is losing the PR war to people that "saw off the heads of other Muslims."
The New York Times reported last Wednesday that although the board's report
does not constitute official government policy, it captures "the essential themes
of a debate that is now roiling not just the Defense Department but the entire
United States government."
///
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'Muslims do not hate our freedom, but rather they hate our policies [the report says]. The
overwhelming majority voice their objections to what they see as one-sided support in
favor of Israel and against Palestinian rights, and the long-standing, even increasing,
support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies, most notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Pakistan and the Gulf states. Thus, when American public diplomacy talks about
bringing democracy to Islamic societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving
hypocrisy.'
The current Board is authorized to consist of thirty-two members plus seven ex officio
members': the chairmen of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Policy, Ballistic Missile Defense
Advisory Committee, and Defense Intelligence Agency Science and Technology Advisory
Committee. 'Members, whose appointed terms range from one to four years, are selected
on the basis of their preeminence in the fields of science, technology and its application
to military operations, research, engineering, manufacturing and acquisition process.'
In stark contrast to the cold war, the United States today is not seeking to contain a
threatening state empire, but rather seeking to convert a broad movement within Islamic
civilization to accept the value structure of Western Modernity - an agenda hidden within
the official rubric of a 'War on Terrorism,' [the report states].
If we really want to see the Muslim world as a whole [the report states], and the
Arabic-speaking world in particular, move more toward our understanding of moderation
and tolerance, we must reassure Muslims that this does not mean that they must submit
to the American way.
Wars are fought for political ends. Soldiers can only do so much. And the last mile in every
war is about claiming the political fruits. The bad guys in Iraq can lose every mile on every
road, but if they beat America on the last mile - because they are able to intimidate better
than America is able to coordinate, protect, inform, invest and motivate - they will win and
America will lose.
Perceptions of public diplomacy in crisis. Since the Defense Science Board's October
2001 Task Force study, more than 15 private sector and Congressional reports have
examined public diplomacy: the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and
Muslim World ("Djerejian group"), the Council on Foreign Relatinos, The Heritage
Foundation, The Brookings Institution, The Aspen Institute, the Public Diplomacy Institute,
the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and several reports each by the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Public Diplomacy, the U.S. General Accounting Office, and Congressional
committees.
There is consensus in these reports that U.S. public diplomacy is in crisis. Missing are
strong leadership, strategic direction, adequate coordination, sufficient resources, and a
culture of measurement and evaluation. America's image problem, many suggest, is linked
to perceptions of the United States as arrogant, hypocritical, and self-indulgent.
The number and depth of these reports indicate widespread concern among influential
observers that something must be done about public diplomacy. But so far these concerns
have produced no real change. The White House has paid little attention. Congressional
actions have been limited to informational hearings and funding for Middle East broad
casting initiatives, Radio Sawa and Al Hurra.
_____
But this is no Cold War. We call it a war on terrorism, but Muslims in contrast see a history-
shaking movement of Islamic restoration. This is not simply a religious revival, however, but
also a renewal of the Muslim World itself. And it has taken form through many variant
movements, both moderate and militant, with many millions of adherents, of which radical
fighters are only a small part. Moreover, these movements for restoration also represent, in
their variant visions, the reality of multiple identities within Islam.
If there is one overarching goal they share, it is the overthrow of what Islamists call the
"apostate" regimes: the tyrannies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and the Gulf
states. They are the main target of the broader Islamist movement, as well as the actual
fighter groups. The United States finds itself in the strategically awkward -- and potentially
dangerous -- situation of being the longstanding prop and alliance partner of these
authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes could not survive. Thus the U.S. has
strongly taken sides in a desperate struggle that is both broadly cast for all Muslims and
country-specific.
This is the larger strategic context, and it is acutely uncomfortable: U.S. policies and actions
are increasingly seen by the overwhelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the survival of
Islam itself. Three recent polls of Muslims show an overwhelming conviction that the U.S.
seeks to "dominate" and "weaken" the Muslim World." Not only is every American initiative
and commitment in the Muslim World enmeshed in the larger dynamic of intra-Islamic
hostilities -- but Americans have inserted themselves into this intra-Islamic struggle in ways
that have made us an enemy to most Muslims.
_____
The information campaign -- or as some still would have it, "the war of ideas," or the
struggle for "hearts and minds" -- is important to every war effort. In this war it is an
essential objective, because the larger goals of U.S. strategy depend on separating the vast
majority of non-violent Muslims from the radical-militant Islamist-Jihadists. But American
efforts have not only failed in this respect: they may also have achieved the opposite of what
they intended.
_____
American direct intervention in the Muslim World has paradoxically elevated the stature of
and support for radical Islamists, while diminishing support for the United States to single-
digits in some Arab societies.
- Muslims do not "hate our freedom," but rather, they hate our policies. The
overwhelming majority voice their objections to what they see as one-sided support
in favor of Israel and against Palestinian rights, and the longstanding, even
increasing support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies, most notably
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and the Gulf states.
- Thus when American public diplomacy talks about bringing democracy to Islamic
societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy. Moreover, saying that
"freedom is the future of the Middle East" is seen as patronizing, suggesting that
Arabs are like the enslaved peoples of the old Communist World -- but Muslims do
not feel this way: they feel oppressed, but not enslaved.
- Furthermore, in the eyes of Muslims, American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq
has not led to democracy there, but only more chaos and suffering. U.S. actions
appear in contrast to be motivated by ulterior motives, and deliberately controlled in
order to best serve American national interests at the expense of truly Muslim
selfdetermination.
- Therefore, the dramatic narrative since 9/11 has essentially borne out the entire
radical Islamist bill of particulars. American actions and the flow of events have
elevated the authority of the Jihadi insurgents and tended to ratify their legitimacy
among Muslims. Fighting groups portray themselves as the true defenders of an
Ummah (the entire Muslim community) invaded and under attack -- to broad public
support.
- What was a marginal network is now an Ummah-wide movement of fighting groups.
Not only has there been a proliferation of "terrorist" groups: the unifying context of a
shared cause creates a sense of affiliation across the many cultural and sectarian
boundaries that divide Islam.
- Finally, Muslims see Americans as strangely narcissistic -- namely, that the war is
all about us. As the Muslims see it, everything about the war is -- for Americans --
really no more than an extension of AMerican domestic politics and its great game.
This perception is of course necessarily heightened by election-year atmospherics,
but nonetheless sustains their impression that when Americans talk to Muslims they
are really just talking to themselves.
_____
It is incumbent on the U.S. strategic information campaign to first find a way to address this
near-unanimity of Muslim opinion hostile to the U.S. If we want to truly demonstrate the
linkage between American power and the universal values we support, and if we want to
truly build a bridge between ourselves and the Muslim World, then we must first open a
working channel of communication with that world, which as of now does not exist.
Do you think I know what I'm
doing? That for one breath
or half-breath I belong to
myself?
As much as a pen knows
what it's writing, or the ball
can guess where it's going
next.
Jalaluddin Rumi
